This is a reply to Jan Ruis’s comments on the author’s replication of Ruis’s earlier synastry study. It reveals some more results based on Ruis’s comments. It also suggests that articles which claim positive findings for novel investigations should include clear statements of hypotheses to facilitate replication. In this respect, it also discusses the issues involved and the problems encountered when trying to form unambiguous and non-overlapping hypotheses.

At present a key question in astrological research is whether diurnal planetary effects are confined to eminent people. In order to investigate this, 23 predictions concerning the personality correlates of planets placed in Gauquelin’s plus zones at birth were obtained from previous experiments and from judges. These predictions were tested on 468 ordinary people by means of 11 measures of personality from the EPQ and the 16PF. Only three of the predictions gained any support: Mars in plus zones was associated with Psychoticism (p<0.05) and Extraversion (p<0.1). Because of the many failures to replicate, no firm conclusions can be drawn from these results.

A test of the hypothesis that the relationship between astrological birth sign and personality differences in extraversion and neuroticism (as reported by Mayo, White and Eysenck) can be explained in terms of self-attribution of personality descriptions is presented. Responses of n = 799 adult subjects to two questionnaires (German version of the Eysenck Personality Inventory: Belief in and Familiarity with Astrology) were analysed in several analyses of variance, with belief in astrology being one of the independent variables. An explanation of the Mayo-White-Eysenck results in terms of attribution theory was essentially verified.

Six astrologers matched 23 birth charts to comprehensive case files, including photographs, as specified by them. The charts were of native Americans (4 men, 19 women) aged 30-32 years. Birth times were verified by birth records and in most cases were recorded with a precision of five minutes or better. The mean accuracy (i.e.., agreement with the case files), expressed as Cohen’s kappa, was 0.02. The mean agreement between astrologers was 0.03. Accuracy was unrelated to confidence or to birth time precision. In a follow-up study, five groups of 5-6 astrologers each matched a subset of 5 charts, so that collectively all 23 charts were matched. The mean accuracy was -0.15, or worse than chance. Although the astrologers had collaborated to make the experiment as fair as possible, the negative findings had no effect on their belief in the validity of astrology.

Astrology, as a language of codes and signs, can be explored using semiotics and language theories to bring a new understanding. Wittgenstein’s attempts to create a totally logical language is considered and his view of mathematics as a form of language. The theories of social criticism that make up the approach of Deconstruction also explore the limits of language and address many of the linguistic and interpretive issues also found in astrology. Thus, how Deconstructive approaches are conducted may reveal new ways of working with astrological symbolism. Heidegger’s phenomenology may also shed light on astrology’s workings. These various approaches are contrasted with the views of Jung, which are often used to underpin modern astrological unconscious behaviour. The work of the phenomenological and linguistically orientated psycho-analyst, Jaques Lacan, is considered, along with the criticisms of Jean Paul Sartre. Confusions between theories about archetypes and social movements/attitudes are described and the need for astrology to develop a more coherent theory of the relationship of Being to Time. The psychopathological approach, which underlies nearly all depth psychology, needs to be questioned when applying astrological ideas to human affairs. Alternative models of human existence, stemming from phenomenology, may greatly assist in describing astrology’s working in the world.

Astrology, as a language of codes and signs, can be explored using semiotics and language theories to bring a new understanding. Wittgenstein’s attempts to create a totally logical language is considered and his view of mathematics as a form of language. The theories of social criticism that make up the approach of Deconstruction also explore the limits of language and address many of the linguistic and interpretive issues also found in astrology. Thus, how Deconstructive approaches are conducted may reveal new ways of working with astrological symbolism. Heidegger’s phenomenology may also shed light on astrology’s workings. These various approaches are contrasted with the views of Jung, which are often used to underpin modern astrological unconscious behaviour. The work of the phenomenological and linguistically orientated psycho-analyst, Jaques Lacan, is considered, along with the criticisms of Jean Paul Sartre. Confusions between theories about archetypes and social movements/attitudes are described and the need for astrology to develop a more coherent theory of the relationship of Being to Time. The psychopathological approach, which underlies nearly all depth psychology, needs to be questioned when applying astrological ideas to human affairs. Alternative models of human existence, stemming from phenomenology, may greatly assist in describing astrology’s working in the world.

A “time-switching” control applied to Hill and Thompson’s original 500 redheads’ birth data supported the separate significance levels claimed for their “Mars-Redhead Link” results and revealed that if a single hypothesis had been employed the significance would have been p<10-8.

Each of 122 subjects, married or in an intimate living-together relationship, ranked five descriptions, based on planetary inter-aspects only, of partners, one of which was his/her own, from “most” to “least true” of his/her actual experience. Half the sample were sent control descriptions of relationships randomly selected from the whole sample of relationships; the other half were sent control descriptions of contrived relationships between the subject and four hypothetical partners to him or her, all of whom shared the Sun-sign of the subject’s actual partner. Subjects chose the correct astrological description of their experience of their partner among the five possible positions at significantly better than chance (p<.5). Discrimination of actual partners was clearly found to be easier from random controls than from among same Sun-sign controls, though this was not statistically evaluated.

A sample of 175 mixed adults completed a 36-item questionnaire addressed to likely Pluto meanings, namely intensification, exaggeration, social power, transformation, and suppression. A comparison with Pluto aspects in the natal charts found no evidence to support any of these meanings.

Each of the authors addressed a subset of the issues raised by Dean and Loptson in Discourse for Key Topic 2: some philosophical problems of astrology (Correlation 14(2) pp32- 44). Among the points: (1) The metaphysical principle “as above, so below” can only be understood within a classical cosmology (Pierce). (2) We must be clear about our definitions of “astrology” when formulating criticisms of it. Is the critic addressing the “study of the relationships between the stars and human affairs” or the activities of astrologers? Use of the dichotomy of satisfaction versus accuracy as a way of differentiating astrology from established sciences results from blurring this distinction (Iriving). (3) As positivism became a dominant philosophy, the misapplication of the methods of natural science to other domains was a category error (Urban-Lurain) (4) The evaluation of a discipline on the basis of scientific evidence requires an understanding of the nature of such evidence and its proper interpretation. A lack of physical mechanism for phenomena in any given domain of inquiry does not preclude scientific status for the inquiry. Fate, as understood in the context of astrology, limits freedom to a lesser degree than determinism. Prediction in the context of science must not be confused with prognostication; the latter is irrelevant to evaluating the validity of scientific theories (McPherson).